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Abstract 
Assurance categories were previously developed to support the Department of 
Homeland Security’s efforts in the mitigation of Cyber Control System events.  
Defined according to the risk of life and economic loss, the minimum range is 
designated by policy; whereas, the maximum limit seems to be constrained only 
by limits and interdependencies of the event.  Use of this life / assets scale has 
proven to be helpful in managing risk due to the scales ease in use, 
communication, and understanding.  Suggestions have been made that this scale 
could be applied to all events of terror, disaster, and calamity of an international 
scale, with equally good results.  This paper will present the history of some 
existing scales of disaster and assurance, the rationale behind the development of 
the original Security Assurance Index, and our proposed scale of disaster and 
calamity as a World Risk Index. 
Keywords: World Risk Index, Security Assurance, risk management, risk scale.  
1 Introduction
Since 9-11, the United States has been allocating a tremendous amount of 
resources for the prevention of future terrorist attacks.  Within the month, the 
President established an executive-level Office of Homeland Security (OHS) 
with a mission to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a 
comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States (its people and 
physical assets) from terrorist threats or attacks.”  Within the year, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
which integrated many federal agencies into one organization with the purpose 
of protecting the homeland.  Although DHS supersedes the function of OHS, the 
overall mission remains the same.  
In its mission of protection, deterrence, and mitigation, DHS has organized 
its activities according to threats, targets, and recovery assets.  Threats include 
the weapons of bioterrorism, nuclear, and cyber assets; targets include centers of 
population, critical infrastructure, and national icons: and recovery assets include 
emergency planning, evacuation planning, and medical response.   Because DHS 
does not have the resources to protect, deter, and mitigate, its primary purpose is 
to integrate the many existing federal agency activities and enable them to more 
effectively deal with threat, target, and mitigation activities.  For this reason 
DHS established the Control System Security Program, managed by the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL) to “reduce the risk to the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure from cyber attacks on control systems.”   
To develop a program in reducing risk from terrorist attack on control 
systems, the risk of attack must first be calculated.  Risk is classically calculated 
as a “combination of the probability and the consequence of a hazard (or threat 
event)”1:
  Risk = Probability (of Attack) * Consequence (of Attack)  (1) 
Logically, if either probability or consequence of attack is zero, risk will be 
zero.  In general, the probability of attack (best expressed as a probability per 
unit time or frequency) on a control system is typically very low (approaching 
10-9 or even 10-12 events per year) and it may be very high (103 or even 106
events per day).  On the other hand, the consequences may be insignificant and 
they may be catastrophic.  Given this range in risk outcomes, understanding the 
impact of risk reduction activities is a primary goal in managing terrorist risk to 
control systems.  Likewise, communicating the risk of these very low probability 
/ very high consequence events is also difficult.     
To help manage the risk of cyber attack on control systems, INL developed 
a Security Assurance Index (SAI) to communicate risk.  While presenting this 
scale for review, other risk management professionals suggested that the SAI 
could be modified to communicate world risk events.  Thus, the purpose of this 
paper is: 1) to present the development and use of INL’s SAI, and 2) to propose 
the development and use of a World Risk Index (WRI) to communicate the risk 
of events that threaten the world’s population.   
2 Control System Risk and Development of the SAL 
INL has been tasked by DHS “to reduce the risk to the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure from cyber attacks on control systems.”  Control systems have 
been recognized as a significant threat and security issue due to the power a 
control system provides a malfeasant or criminal element.  This power is 
inherent due to a control systems function which is to manage and control the 
behaviour of other systems, subsystems, and their components.  Thus, the 
incorrect operation of a control system impacts the function of the entire system.  
Worse, a control system could be used to deliberately damage the system, 
damage other interdependent systems, and possibly use the system as a weapon 
against people.   
 A prime example of control system’s power is provided by the 
interrelationships of a critical infrastructure such as water, electricity, or mass 
transit system and the community that depends on them.  Thus, not only is it 
possible to damage a critical infrastructure asset using a control system, this 
control would create secondary effects such as economic disruption, injuries, and 
death.  Given these interdependencies, consequences from a control system 
attack are significant: 1) if control systems are prevalent within infrastructure, 2) 
if these control systems are insecure, and 3) if the knowledge of cyber and 
control systems is within the terrorist’s capability.   
 In the process of risk management, we have discovered that communicating 
risk is difficult.  Our experience suggests that risk is usually communicated as a 
qualitative measure (low, medium, high) versus a quantitative measure 
(probability, consequence, and probable loss).  From our observations, this 
difficulty in communication is a result of three issues: 1) lack of incident data, 2) 
lack of knowledge on attacker capabilities, and 3) the ever changing environment 
of cyber and control system technologies.  Given this overall general lack of 
knowledge, when risk is calculated, it is usually distributed over a wide range of 
possible outcomes, depending on the available data, the bias of the evaluators, 
and intent of the risk evaluation.   
2.1  Problem Statement 
Risk management includes the activities of assessing, evaluating, and mitigating 
risk.  In efforts to reduce risk, risk must be effectively communicated between 
people of different interests, skills, and objectives.  Most importantly, if we are 
to reduce risk, we must be able to measure and communicate the effects of risk 
reduction.  This is our primary problem, “How can we effectively communicate 
control system risk?”
2.2  Initial Communication Requirements 
In solving this problem, we determined that we needed a communication tool.  A 
tool is a good solution as it provides a process, method, and standardization.  To 
acquire this tool, we identified a list of “must have” requirements through an 
informal and iterative process of generation and review:  
x risk must be communicated by a scale of measure  
x The risk measure must be calculated with minimum information 
x The risk measure must be calculated across many infrastructure sectors 
x The scale must be easy to use, communicate, and understand 
x The scale must become indispensable to the risk management process 
x The scale may be similar to the DHS scale 
 Often, the fastest way to acquire a tool is buy it off the shelf and adopt a 
process already in use.  For this reason, we allocated time to identify other scales 
in risk communication and review their advantages and disadvantages.  We left 
open the option of whether we would adopt, adapt, or develop our own scale.  
During this review, it became obvious that risk scales (as well as all other scales) 
are simply human constructs of reality or perceived reality.  Some scales provide 
better constructs than others, but the success of any scale that communicates risk 
would be measured by its popular use.  Knowing this, it was imperative that our 
risk scale would have those attributes to insure adoption. 
2.3 Review of Scales in Risk Communication 
For the purpose of organizing the discussion, we have organized the scales into 
three separate reviews: 1) the existing DHS Scale, 2) scales in natural disaster 
risk, and 3) scales in security and safety risk.  We are not aware of any formal 
organization for scales used in communicating risk. 
2.3.1 The DHS Scale  
The DHS communicates and advises the US public on security risk using their 
Homeland Security Advisory System2.  A risk value is determined by threat and 
vulnerability assessment information; however, because consequences are not 
included in the analysis, risk is implied by the vulnerability, threat, and potential 
consequence.  This implied risk is communicated using a simple color scale:  
x Red – Orange – Yellow – Blue – Green 
x The highest risk level, Red, signifies “severe risk of terrorist attacks” 
x The lowest risk level, Green, signifies “low risk of terrorist attack” 
 The advantages of this scale are its ease in understanding, similar to any 
scale that uses red to alert danger and blue or green to alert an all safe condition.  
However, although easy to communicate, it is commonly agreed that this scale is 
ignored and fallen out of general use.  Although there may be many reasons for 
this, our primary criticism is the lack of a published method to determine risk 
(i.e., when does a “red” alert change to an “orange” alert).  Furthermore, because 
the entire nation is put on alert versus regional or local alert, people tend to 
ignore information when they are not part of the threat situation.  Thus, although 
the scale communicates risk effectively, it has not been administered correctly.   
 We concluded that even if we could fix this scale as a quantitative scale of 
measure, the process of modifying and approving these modifications would be 
difficult.  However, the color code system has advantages in communication. 
2.3.2 Scales of Natural Disaster Risk  
Many scales are used to communicate risk of natural disasters.  However, all of 
the scales we reviewed measured specific threats versus a general threat.  We 
have listed the better known scales3 that are used to communicate the risk of 
many natural threats common to the US over the course of the year: 
x Fujita (F1 – F5) measures tornadoes 
x Richter (1 – 8) measures earthquakes 
x Modified Mercalli (I – XII) measures earthquakes 
x Saffir-Simpson (Cat-1 – Cat-5 / white to red) measures hurricanes 
x Torino (0 – 10 / white to red) measures near-earth objects 
 Similar to the DHS scale, all of these scales organize threat on an increasing 
scale where a higher number indicates a greater threat (and risk).  Likewise, all 
of these scales require the user to estimate probability to calculate their personal 
risk to life, limb, and property given their individual situation.  However, it is 
common for local authorities to evaluate local threat information from which 
they communicate risk warnings or even mandate actions to be taken by the local 
population. 
 Most of these scales color code each category to communicate the threat and 
implied risk visually.  Like the DHS scale, most of these scales use a minimum 
number of levels, often five, which minimizes and simplifies the communication 
process.  The exception to these rules seems to be those events where the 
consequences could extend beyond a region such as the threat posed by near-
earth objects.  Near earth objects have the capability of impacting humanity on 
national, continental, and world scale.  However, because disasters of world-
wide scale are not often experienced by humans, scales of calamity are not 
typically communicated on a daily basis (the Torino scale was the least 
recognized scale).  However, we noted that the Torino scale might be appropriate 
for certain terror events where weapons of mass destruction (bioterrorism, 
nuclear events) could have national and world-wide effects.   
 Given these observations, our overall suggestion is that many of these scales 
would communicate risk more effectively if they calculated risk versus ranking 
the events by a threshold of wind speed or ground movement.  For this reason, 
we maintained our requirement of communicating the risk as the outcome of 
event probability and consequence. 
2.3.3 Scales of Security and Safety Risk 
Our review of scales in safety and security suggests that these scales have a very 
narrow application and are typically used only within industry sectors and their 
associated professions.  In general, safety scales are developed to increase the 
safety of a final product and support best practices in design and operation.  
Typically, best practice requires a minimum of analysis to: 1) identify the 
vulnerabilities in construction, manufacturing, and use, 2) provide fault trees, 
event trees, and failure rates to calculate probabilities, and 3) organize the results 
into predetermined categories.  Given this process, most of these scales are used 
only by the design, safety, and industrial engineers within the associated 
industry.  We did not find any situation where the risk of an engineered system 
was communicated to the general public.  
  The ANSI/ISA (American National Standards Institute / Instrument Society 
of America standard S84.01-1996) Security Integrity Index (SIL) is a good 
example of a safety scale which measures the risk of “failure on demand” for 
safety instrument systems4.  Similar to other scales mentioned, a minimum 
number of levels (SIL-1 to SIL-4) refer to the “level of hazard or economic risk”.   
However, as in the previous scales investigated, SIL does not calculate risk as it 
is classically defined; rather, the engineer is required to estimate a probable, 
worst case scenario to understand the risk of the engineered failure rate.   
 All of the security scales we identified were related to food security and its 
associated risk to famine.  In general, these scales are used to communicate the 
risk of famine and help prioritize risk relief efforts.  Interestingly, most of these 
scales calculate and communicate famine risk as potential deaths.  And although 
famine is quite different than a cyber terror event (a long term event versus an 
event of short duration), probabilities and consequences are being calculated to 
determine probable deaths and consequences (risk).  For many reasons, there is 
no widely accepted scale, although the Famine Codes, Food Security Assessment 
Unit, and Famine Intensity Scale have been used to over the last 100 years to 
communicate pending famine calamities5.  Of these, the most promising famine 
scale has been proposed by Paul Howe and Stephan Devereux where famine is 
measured by "intensity" and "magnitude"6.  We noted that, again, most of these 
scales communicate risk using four or five levels where the higher numeric 
values refer to higher famine risk and consequences. 
2.4 Addition to Our Communication Requirements  
Our review of the most commonly used risk scales confirmed our initial 
requirements for good communication.  However, the primary drawback of most 
of these scales is they do not rank risk; rather, they rank threats and imply risk.  
For our purpose, this issue proves to be a serious omission given our experience 
in communicating the control system risk and the complexity of the technology.  
For this reason, we added one more requirement to supports our primary CSSP 
mission:
x The scale must quantitatively measure risk (to be able to reduce risk) 
 Bottom line, our scale must communicate risk on the control systems of this 
country’s critical infrastructure.  Given a sufficiently rigorous process, we could 
assure DHS on the risk posed by a control system given its configuration, 
associated vulnerabilities, target attractiveness, and the potential consequences.  
From this concept of assurance, we named our scale - Security Assurance Index 
(SAI).  Because a scale demands levels, we would classify risk by levels; hence, 
the Security Assurance Level (SAL).   
2.5 Another Observation of the Risk Scales 
Another interesting observation in this review was the mathematical 
relationships between the threshold limits of each level.  Although not strictly 
held, the thresholds between levels are determined using by a logarithmic scale.  
Whether we were talking about energy to move earth (Richter), power of wind 
(Fujita), or the probability in safety failure (SIL), the range within a level is 
defined by the logarithm of the lower boundary.  This is also true of other scales 
in physical phenomena such as light and noise. 
Mathematical in nature, this response to increasing stimulus was first 
postulated by Gustav Fechner in the 19th century as natural and human.  Fechner, 
a German experimental psychologist, suggested from his observation of the 
human senses, that “within limits, the intensity of a sensation, S, increases as the 
logarithm of the stimulus, R,7” or,  
 S = k log R (2)
Known as Fechner’s Law, it has been shown to be applicable to “just 
noticeable differences,” right and wrong, average error, visual distance, visual 
brightness, and weights.  Our observation is that risk may also be communicated 
on a scale of “noticeable differences” similar to other sensations.  Further studies 
are needed to prove this out.   
2.6 Observations in Risk Communication 
Besides the problems in communicating risk, another nagging problem was 
associating threat possibilities to risk possibilities.  This problem is entirely 
determined by the distribution of probable scenarios and their probable 
consequences.  For example, an F-5 tornado may land only on unpopulated areas 
for 4 or 5 miles; whereas, it is possible that the same F-5 tornado may land on 
many densely populated areas and maintain its ferocity for 100 miles or more.  In 
a worst case / best outcome scenario, this event may create only $100k in loss; 
whereas in a worst case / worst case scenario, $1B or more of loss may occur.  
This wide range in consequences not only depends on the random probability of 
the event, but also on human response in defense, security, safety, and recovery.   
 Given these wide ranges in probabilities and consequence, it is conceivable 
that risk can range by 4 or 5 orders-in-magnitude.  Thus, this observation would 
suggest that Katrina could have resulted in a $100M loss if it would have fallen 
on a remote Texas coastline; rather, it landed on New Orleans, creating an 
economic loss exceeding $125B8.  In summary, our communication tool must be 
able to communicate the possibilities of wide ranges in risk outcome. 
To communicate this complexity in scenarios and probabilities, we proposed 
that we could calculate a probable outcome, a single value, to describe this 
distribution of risk.  For example, if we assumed a logarithmic distribution of 
possible outcomes, we could calculate a median value to describe a probable 
outcome.  This assumption proved to be relatively accurate because we know 
consequences are not perfectly random and normally distributed; rather, the 
human actions in survival, response, and intervention tend to skew the outcomes 
to lower consequences.  Thus, to calculate a probable outcome of a distribution 
of consequences, we have been using the following equation to calculate the 
median of an assumed logarithmic distribution: 
 median  = EXP ( ( ( LN (lower) +LN (upper) ) / 2) (3)
From our experience, the risk from terrorist initiated control systems may be 
less random than we originally thought.  Both initiating events and consequences 
are not random by their very nature.  Instead, these events and actions are mostly 
controlled by people or engineered systems.  Terrorists select targets that are 
worth their “investment” in time, money, and people.  They plan and train to 
increase the success of an attack.  Conversely, attacks fail (for reasons other than 
errors, mishaps, and chance) due to security, defense, and response actions of the 
target.  Security, defense, and response planners also plan and train for the 
threats of attack.  These activities reduce the risk by lowering the potential 
consequence.  Thus, given the complexity of attack and defense investments, 
actions, and response, we continue to assume that a reasonable range of possible 
consequences continues to be between 3 or 4 orders-of-magnitude.   
The significance of this observation is that we have come to conclude that 
for our basis of design risk, the range of possible outcomes will be defined as a 
logarithmic distribution of 4 orders-in-magnitude once we have identified the 
worst case / worst outcome scenario.   
2.7  Development of the Security Assurance Index  
As previously stated, the risk posed from control systems can be calculated as a 
mathematical expression of probability and consequence (see Equation 1).  
Although the objective of this paper is not to discuss how we calculate control 
system risks, we felt it important to discuss issues in determining risk given the 
range of consequences for any given scenario.   
 In determining the probability of a successful control system attack, we must 
identify and acknowledge the varying degrees of influence.  For example, there 
are probabilities in whether an attack can be initiated or not, probabilities in how 
the attack is initiated, and probabilities in how the attack progresses.  These 
probabilities may be calculated assuming the following technical and human 
influences: 
x Control system configuration and its inherent vulnerabilities 
x Administration of the control system’s maintenance, security, safety, etc 
x Site Attractiveness and impact or access to other attractive sites 
x The potential attackers, their intent, capabilities, resources, etc 
x The site’s and community response once an attack has been initiated 
x Environmental variables that may impact an initiated attack 
 Likewise, the probabilities in attack consequences are dependent on the 
many variables for each target as well as the interdependencies and outcome of 
the other secondary and unintended effects:  These could include: 
x Human losses, including death and injury to on- and off-site populations 
x Economic losses, including capital, inventory, and environmental 
x Market disruptions, including short- and long-term effects 
x Environmental variables that may impact the outcome of attack 
x Other more difficult to assess consequences such as loss of national 
confidence, influence, freedoms, morale, safety, and emotional stress  
 As terrorism goes, the worst case / worst outcome scenario would be the 
total loss of US population.  (Note: although the authors are not suggesting that 
this could be possible given the U.S.’s geographical size, isolation, and systems 
in defense, security, and response, we propose this outcome as an extreme 
consequence, an outcome ad nauseam to define the upper boundary for the 
purpose of scale development.  We assumed a scenario for the total loss of 
American lives.  Our estimate of 300M is higher than the 2000 population census 
so that the scale remains relevant for the near future.) 
 Assuming 300M citizens as the upper boundary in loss, our rationale allows 
us to assume a low range consequence of 4 orders-of-magnitude less and a 
logarithmic median as our probable outcome (discussed in section 2.6).  
Assuming this is our worst assurance level, successive assurance levels are 
produced by reducing the each level one order-of-magnitude (discussed in 
Section 2.5) to fully develop a Security Assurance Index (SAI).  (Note: the 
numerically ascending assurance levels are of interest to the CSSP; alpha 
designation indicates risk levels below the interest of the CSSP.) 
Table 1. Security Assurance Index – US Centric View - Loss of Life 
range of lost life 
     
Assurance 
level 
 Low-
range 
median      
life lost 
high-
range 
SAL 9 3,000,000   
SAL 8 300,000 9,486,833 300,000,000 
SAL 7 30,000 948,683 30,000,000 
SAL 6 3,000 94,868 3,000,000 
SAL 5 300 9,487 300,000 
SAL 4 30 949 30,000 
SAL 3 3 95 3,000 
SAL 2 0.3 9 300 
SAL 1 0.03 1 30 
SAL A 0.003 0.1 3 
SAL B 0.0003 0.01 0.3 
SAL C 0.00003 0.001 0.03 
SAL D 0.000003 0.0001 0.003 
SAL E 0.0000003 0.00001 0.0003 
SAL F 0.00000003 0.000001 0.00003 
SAL G 0.000000003 0.0000001 0.000003 
 Likewise, levels of assurance were defined for economic losses.  Although 
these values are specific to the US economic situation, they could be easily 
modified to the economic losses of other countries.  These economic losses were 
calculated on the economic value of life, injury, asset, consumable, and 
environment losses, as well as irreplaceable loss of historical, social, and 
religious sites and artifacts.  (Note: although evaluating economic losses can 
generate much debate [i.e., the value of life], economic losses are an important 
measure of loss, especially if no life has been lost yet significant damage has 
occurred.)  Using the US centric loss of life table, a similar US centric schedule 
of economic loss was calculated.  
Table 2. Security Assurance Index – US Centric View – Economic Loss 
  Range of economic loss 
assurance 
level 
 Low-end Median           
economic loss 
high-end 
   
SAL 9 7,125,000,000,000   
SAL 8 750,000,000,000 32,413,538,837,961 1,400,850,000,000,000 
SAL 7 75,000,000,000 3,455,294,849,937 159,187,500,000,000 
SAL 6 7,350,000,000 404,726,991,316 22,286,250,000,000 
SAL 5 720,000,000 49,075,452,112 3,345,000,000,000 
SAL 4 33,750,000 3,735,440,486 413,437,500,000 
SAL 3 3,375,000 626,979,366 116,475,000,000 
SAL 2 337,500 79,962,100 18,945,000,000 
SAL 1 33,750 9,704,389 2,790,375,000 
SAL A 3,375 1,140,197 385,200,000 
SAL B 338 114,020 48,150,000 
SAL C 34 12,748 4,815,000 
SAL D 3 1,275 481,500 
SAL E 0.3 127 48,150 
SAL F 0.03 13 4,815 
SAL G 0.003 1 482
2.8  Comments on Using the SAI and Assigning a SAL  
Because we use these tables to communicate risk, it is important that we measure 
and interpret risk in an equal, fair, and consistent approach.  Failure to do so 
would result in a loss of confidence and its adoption.   
 An important step in communicating risk concerns the design of the 
evaluation.  Any evaluation must be designed according to the number of sites to 
be evaluated, the potential attack scenarios of each site, and the information 
available on each site.  Our experience suggests that exhaustive and thorough 
evaluations are not required; rather, inclusive evaluations best serve process, 
especially when resources are scare.  We define inclusive as including those sites 
that would appear to be most attractive targets and those sites should be most 
attractive (this assumes perfect information).  Once the list of sites have been 
identified, an evaluation process is developed that can be applied equally; thus, 
the evaluation must consider information of the lowest common denominator.  
Lastly, a sufficient set of reasonable yet imaginative attack scenarios must be 
defined to be applied to this list.  In general, although it possible to have 
hundreds of attack scenarios, it is best to limit this exercise to five or ten worst 
case scenarios with accompanying range of possible consequences.  Note that 
this evaluation process may have to be modified to account for unexpected 
outcomes in information gathering and calculated risk outcomes.  
 Once calculated, this risk value or range in risk values can be assigned a 
SAL using either Loss of Life or Economic Loss tables.  If the median falls 
within 20% or 30% of the SAL median, this site and scenario can be ranked 
fairly easily.  However, if the calculated median falls equally between the 
medians of the SALs, one should consider the distribution of risk around the 
calculated value.  Would risk have a tendency to be greater than we calculated?  
Or would it be less?    
 Additionally, we also consider both risk measures (Loss of Life and 
Economic Loss) when assigning the SAL.  Because we want to error on the 
conservative side, we always defer to the scale that assigns a higher SAL.  For 
example, if the our loss of life is expected to be 15 to 20 yet the economic losses 
are expected to be more than $10B, we would classify this site as a SAL 4 
instead of a SAL 2.  On the other hand, if our economic losses are anticipated to 
be no more than $100M yet we could expect 100 deaths, we would classify this 
site as a SAL 3 instead of SAL 2. 
3 A Proposed Scale of World Disaster 
So far, we have discussed the development and use of INL’s security assurance 
index.  However, using the SAI to evaluate the risk of terrorism outside the US 
would pose significantly different and unintended results, especially for those 
countries with smaller populations and incomes such as the Netherlands (15.7M, 
$389B), Estonia (1.4M, $4.9B), or Bermuda (0.1M, $2.5B).  Nonetheless, this 
issue has not discouraged many risk management professionals to suggest that a 
similar scale could provide a useful tool in communicating risk of natural and 
human initiated disasters and calamities.  Thus, this is the final purpose of this 
last section. 
3.1  Purpose for an World Risk Index  
Similar to our problem in communicating the risk of control systems, a World 
Risk Index (WRI) would communicate the issues of risk from pending, probable, 
and actual disasters.     
 Ideally, a WRI would communicate the risk faced by all world communities 
concerning bioterrorism, pandemics, weapons of mass destruction, natural 
disasters, celestial disasters, and even global warming.  Presented in a generic 
and easy to understand index, we would agree that a WRI would contribute to 
the communication of many situations of risk facing humanity today.  
3.2  The Proposed World Risk Index 
Similar to the CSSP’s SAI, our proposed WRI would communicate risk.  
However, the authors have identified two critical issues would have to be 
resolved for any scale to find international adoption.  The first issue is finding 
and defining a unit of measure acceptable by all societies.  Measures of value 
tend to be very contentious due to differing value systems within each society.  
The second issue is defining a relevant risk event. 
3.2.1 Defining a Relevant Risk Event 
One may ask”Why is it important that a risk event be defined?”   
 A primary concern would be that resources usually follow policy.  
Assuming a WRI could be defined and assuming it is accepted, a broad 
interpretation of “risk event” could strain the resources for risk management and 
mitigation.  This may be especially true of those human initiated events 
associated with continuing struggles and war between nations, peoples, and 
ideologies.  The one-time use of a weapon of mass destruction on a city of non-
combatants could be an event that demands international response; whereas, the 
same weapon associated with continued war may not.  Both scenarios are 
concerned with the risk of a weapon of mass destruction on humanity; however, 
a WRI might prove to be more divisive.   
 Our suggestion is any risk event should be defined as a single, definable 
action, of natural or human influence, that results in negative consequences 
against the people, communities, or nations of the world.  Assuming this 
definition, the remainder of this paper is devoted to the development of a WRI. 
3.2.2 The Proposed Unit of Measure for International Risk 
Currently, an SAI evaluation measures risk on two scales: 1) loss of life and 2) 
economic loss.  Although we have found both scales useful in measuring risk 
reduction in US control systems, it is likely that the risk of economic loss will 
not fit the context of risk management on a world stage.  
 Economic loss is contentious simply because there is no common, 
international measure for economic value.  Although we could devise a system 
of continuous risk evaluations given the change in monetary exchange rates, 
local economic issues of many countries may not be appreciated on a world stage 
due to differing value systems.  In response, economists have made efforts to 
define more meaningful economic measures using concepts of purchasing power 
parity equivalents.  However, although it may be an interesting exercise to 
determine economic loss using a Big Mac9, this measure would be an unfair 
representation of social and economic values where Big Macs do not exist.   
 On the other hand, life and quality of life measures have become universal.  
Fertility, life expectancy, disease, and death rates measure issues that pervade all 
societies and ideologies.  And although the value of life on earth may be 
different within societies, the fact is that life is a common unit of measure to all 
people.  Thus, when a natural disaster has a consequence in killing 120,000 
people, all people and nations seem to understand this scale of impact with 
clarity. 
 In a relatively easy exercise, the US centric view in loss of life has been 
adjusted to fit a world centric view.  (To create a scale of lasting scale measure, 
we have rounded up the world population to 10B.)  Similarly, a WRI would be 
composed of ten world risk levels (WRL) flexible enough in breadth and scale to 
adjust to continued world population growth as well as its potential demise.  
Furthermore, a log value of the median life lost can be calculated to determine a 
partial and more accurate WRL ranking.  
Table 3:  World Risk Index – Loss of Lives 
range of lost life 
     
World Risk 
Level 
 low-range median     
life lost 
high-range 
   
WRL 10 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 10,000,000,000 
WRL 9 10,000,000 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 
WRL 8 1,000,000 10,000,000 100,000,000 
WRL 7 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 
WRL 6 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 
WRL 5 1,000 10,000 100,000 
WRL 4 100 1,000 10,000 
WRL 3 10 100 1,000 
WRL 2 1 10 100 
WRL 1 0.1 1 10 
 Historically, most of the world’s most risk events fall within the WRL 3 
through WRL 6 levels where 100 to 100,000 people are killed from the natural 
events of cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions.  Of more 
interest would be those events of famines, pandemics, and near-earth objects that 
could kill 1M to 100M people.  It is a stretch of the imagination to think of 
human initiated events of this scale; however, a creative imagination in weapons 
of mass destruction could create these outcomes. 
 Objections to this proposed WRI would probably come from countries of 
smaller populations.  For example, the risk of 10,000 potential deaths would 
have a tremendously different impact on Bermuda (pop 65,365, 15.3% loss) 
versus its impact on the US (pop 300M, a 0.0035% loss).   Both losses would 
impact the country tremendously; however, Bermuda would suffer by 3 or 4 
orders-in-magnitude. 
 To account for the influence of population, the scale could be weighted 
according to the subject country, region, or state contribution to the world 
population.  Modifying the above scale to a percentage of population lost for a 
selected country, region, or state, this scale could be applied to a germane geo-
political interest: 
Table 4:  World Risk Index – by % Loss of Population 
range of lost life 
     
World Risk 
Level 
 low-range % median    
life lost 
high-
range 
   
WRL 10 1.00% 31.6% 1000.0% 
WRL 9 0.10% 3.2% 100.0% 
WRL 8 0.01% 0.32% 10.0% 
WRL 7 0.001% 0.032% 1.0% 
WRL 6 0.0001% 0.0032% 0.1% 
WRL 5 0.00001% 0.00032% 0.01% 
WRL 4 0.000001% 0.000032% 0.001% 
WRL 3 0.0000001% 0.0000032% 0.0001% 
WRL 2 0.00000001% 0.00000032% 0.00001% 
WRL 1 0.000000001% 0.000000032% 0.000001% 
WRL 0 0.0000000001% 0.0000000032% 0.0000001% 
  Using this scale, a WRL 8 event would be a loss of 207 lives in Bermuda, 
935,250 lives in the US, and 20,385,000 lives worldwide.  Interestingly, because 
current predictions of the potential, world-wide H1N5 avian pandemic range 
within these consequences, H1N5 could be simply stated as a WRL 8 event.  
Given that most experts agree that this pandemic will eventually happen (it is 
only a question of when), this simple ranking provides a sound and easy to 
communicate basis as to why this pandemic should be of great concern to 
humanity. 
4 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Generally speaking, most of the existing scales in risk to not communicate 
calculated risk; rather, they communicate threat thresholds, which in turn, imply 
potential consequences.  The major disadvantage in this communication is that 
they require people to predict the probability of an event and require the people 
to calculate the risk given their personal situation.  Thus, unless the public is 
well-informed on many issues of threats, probabilities, and consequences, people 
tend to understate or overstate risk depending on their concerns and biases.  To 
remediate this problem, a scale must communicate risk as a function of event 
probability and the probability of consequence.   
 Based on other successful scales that communicate risk, we developed a 
Security Assurance Index (SAI) to address risk as a quantitative measure within 
the DHS Control System Security Program.  Other risk management 
practitioners have suggested that this index could be modified to communicate 
issues of world risk.  To this pursuit, we have presented two scales of World 
Risk Index (WRI), one based on the number of deaths, and another on the 
percentage of population killed.  At this point in time, the authors prefer a scale 
based on the percentage of population impacted within a nation, continental 
region, or common community.  Logically, this scale would be used to 
communicate mitigation and response measures according to the pending or 
actual consequences of a disaster.   
 Risk scales have many advantages over threat scales.  Primarily, threat 
scales measure only physical attributes of an event; whereas, risk scales include 
these physical attributes, probable threats, and probable impacts.  Additionally, 
ranges in consequences are incorporated in the risk evaluation process; thus, the 
probability of extreme events and outcomes are accounted for and contribute to 
the final risk ranking.  However, the greatest advantage is the simple and clear 
message in communicating the potential and actual consequence of a disaster by 
a simple to understand ranking.  Thus, an index of probable outcome alerts and 
communicates to the world communities the potential fate of an event, which in 
turn, may initiate a more timely and adequate response. 
 This primary issue in developing any WRI is finding a common measure for 
risk assessment.  Without a doubt, the most common measure for risk is human 
life; other measures may find acceptance among some communities and not by 
others.  Although this single measure may not capture the consequences of 
economic loss, environmental stress, and political change, a WRI may provide 
an initial tool from which the world’s communities can find a common ground.  
From our experience, a good communication tool initiates a process and a 
standard from which the risk of potential disasters can be effectively managed.  
Although any scale may be imperfect, it is easy to argue that some 
communication is better than no communication, and hopefully, these efforts 
may be just enough to make a difference and change the outcome for the better. 
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